Consensus encalpsulates the inherent problems of building fault tolerant distributed systems. In this context, the classic model of Byzantine faulty processes can be restated such that messages from a subset of processes can be arbitrarily corrupted (including addition and omission of messages).
INTRODUCTION
When looking at distributed systems with (non-benign) corruption faults, we can distinguish between (i) state faults, that hit the state of the processes, and (ii) transmission faults, that affect the information that is exchanged among processes. The first class received more attention in literature, one noteworthy exception is the seminal work of Santoro and Widmayer [18] . Moreover, due to quite discouraging impossibility results regarding agreement tasks (like consensus) in the presence of unreliable communication [9, 18, 21] , communication faults were often mapped to process faults in order to be able to define and solve representative problems. In case the erroneous message stems from a corrupted state, this modelling of transmission faults as faulty processes is somehow natural.
In contrast to this classical approach, in this paper we explicitly look at the second type of faults, i.e., we consider only transmission faults, and no state corruptions. In this context the notion of a "faulty process" becomes much more problematic: In fact, the scenario, where a process p should send a message m to a process q, but q receives a message m ′ different from m may have the following causes:
• p has sent m ′ instead of m (send value fault),
• m was correctly transmitted, but q erroneously delivers m ′ (receive value fault),
• p and q behaved correctly, but the channel from p to q has corrupted m to m ′ (faulty channel).
A benign fault is the special case of the former example with m ′ being just not received. Here, Charron-Bost and Schiper [6] have shown that it is not only unnecessary to distinguish these three types of faults, but also may be harmful.
In this paper, we extend the round-based approach of [6] to value faults. 1 In this approach, we reason about faults only as being transmission faults, without looking for a "culprit" for the fault. As in [6] , we are thus able -in the classical terminology -to deal with both dynamic and transient faults. A transient fault is a non-permanent fault; a dynamic fault is a fault that can affect any process/channel in the system -as opposed to static faults that affect at most f out of n processes per run.
Transmission faults are addressed in this paper in the context of the HO model (which stands for Heard-Of) defined for the benign case in [6] . The HO model is a communicationclosed round model inspired by [7] , [8] , and [18] . Note that the round structure of our model does not imply limits on the asynchrony of the system. An algorithm A is specified by sending functions S r p and transition functions T r p for each round r and process p. Then, for each round the discrepancy between what should be sent (with respect to S r p ) and what is actually received is characterized by two sets HO(p, r) and SHO(p, r). The former -which is already defined in the benign case -gives the set of processes from which p receives a message. Additionally, the latter, the safe heard-of set SHO(p, r) denotes the set of processes from which p receives an uncorrupted message at round r. Together with A, by specifying a communication predicate P over the collection of all HO and SHO sets, we get an HO machine A, P . The communication predicate P hereby characterizes all assumptions on the system, like synchrony and failures in a unified way.
Informally, predicates on the SHO and HO collections specify the safety of the communication, whereas those on the HO collections alone characterize liveness of the communication. For the benign case, we always have SHO(p, r) = HO(p, r).
Above all, this paper is related to theoretical aspects of consensus in the presence of non-benign and dynamic faults, following the spirit of Santoro and Widmayer's approach [18, 19] . We are aware that some causes of value faults can be reduced with error correcting codes or signed messages. They can be used to transform some value faults into benign faults, i.e., omissions. Despite the theoretical problem that such techniques are hard to formalize properly [15] , their use is based on the widespread assumption that undetected corruptions have a "neglectable probability". Our approach consists of weakening this assumption by allowing a certain number of undetected corruptions (value faults) per round.
Contribution.
We define a novel computational model for dynamic and transient value faults that leads to new algorithmic solutions for consensus.
We present two algorithms that solve consensus in the presence of transient and dynamic faults, the AT,E and the UT,E,α algorithms. The first algorithm requires a weaker condition for safety of communication than the second one, while the second algorithm requires a weaker condition for liveness of communication than the first one.
We show that these two algorithms require a predicate Pα for safety of consensus that is weaker than some classical assumptions about faulty processes. Moreover, these algorithms allow us to "circumvent" the lower bounds by Santoro and Widmayer [18] (⌊n/2⌋ value transmission faults per round) and by Martin and Alvisi [16] (less than n/5 Byzantine processes for fast consensus). Note that our algorithms do not contradict these bounds as we distinguish between liveness and safety predicates. Our algorithms need a stronger condition for liveness, a condition that makes sense in the context of transient faults. This shows that the lower bounds for permanent faults do not hold with transient faults. For suitable choices of parameters our algorithms attain the lower bound on Byzantine consensus claimed by Lamport [11] .
Organization of the paper. In Section 2 we introduce the HO model for value faults. In Sections 3 and 4 we present two consensus algorithms for this new fault model. We also give expressions on the number of faults that can be tolerated in order to ensure safety as well as communication predicates which ensure liveness. In Section 5 we compare our results to related work.
MODEL
Computations in our model are structured in rounds, that are communication-closed layers in the sense that any message sent in a round can be received only at that round. We give a definition of our round-based model, and introduce the notions of the heard-of sets (HO), which handles omissions, i.e., captures communication liveness properties, and of the safe heard-of sets (SHO), which handles corruptions, i.e., captures communication safety properties. These collections of sets allow us to specify sufficient conditions for solving consensus with our algorithms in Sections 3 and 4.
Heard-Of Sets
Let Π be a finite non-empty set of cardinality n, and let M be a set of messages (optionally including a null placeholder indicating the empty message). To each p in Π, we associate a process, which consists of the following components: a set of states denoted by states p , a subset initp of initial states, and for each positive integer r called round number , a message-sending function S r p mapping states p × Π to a unique message from M , and a state-transition function T r p mapping states p and partial vectors (indexed by Π) of elements of M to states p. The collection of processes is called an algorithm on Π. In each round r, a process p:
1. applies S r p to the current state, and emits the "messages" to be sent (according to its sending function S r p ) to each process; 2. determines the partial vector µ Computation evolves in an infinite sequence of rounds. Each run is entirely determined by the initial configuration (i.e., the collection of process initial states), and the collection of the reception vectors
For each process p and each round r, we introduce two subsets of Π:
• The heard-of set, denoted HO(p, r), which is the support of µ r p , i.e., HO(p, r) = {q ∈ Π : µ r p [q] is defined}.
• The safe heard-of set, denoted SHO(p, r), and defined by In contrast to HO(p, r), process p is not able to determine SHO(p, r).
From the sets HO(p, r) and SHO(p, r), we form the altered heard-of set denoted AHO(p, r) as follows:
For any round r, we further define the kernel , resp. safe kernel , of a round:
The kernel of round r consists of all processes which are heard by all at round r, whereas the safe kernel consists of all processes whose messages were received correctly by all processes. We can generalize this definition to the whole computation:
Similarly, the altered span (of round r) denotes the set of processes from which at least one process received a corrupted message (at round r):
HO Machines
A heard-of machine for a set of processes Π is a pair A, P , where A is an algorithm on Π, and P is a communication predicate, i.e., a predicate over (HO(p, r)) p∈Π, r>0 and (SHO(p, r)) p∈Π, r>0 . Predicates over (HO(p, r)) p∈Π, r>0 characterize the liveness properties of communication, whereas predicates over (SHO(p, r)) p∈Π, r>0 characterize the safety properties of communication.
As an example, we can model the classical assumption, that no more than α processes may send a corrupted information in a computation:
For our algorithms we will consider the weaker predicate Pα that restricts the number of corrupted messages only per round and per process:
with α ∈ R such that 0 ≤ α ≤ n, and we say that a computation has α-safe communication when Pα holds. Note that P perm α implies Pα. We will consider only communication predicates, that are time-invariant: A communication predicate P is time-invariant if it has the same truth value for all heard-of collections (HO(p, r + i))p∈Π,r>0 and (SHO(p, r + i))p∈Π,r>0 for any i ∈ N. This allows processes to start in their execution in any round r, while preserving the truth value of P. The predicates P perm α and Pα are trivially time-invariant, since 2 Note that in the classical Byzantine setting, also the state of a "faulty" process can be corrupted, which is not the case in our model (see Section 5.2 for a discussion). they are permanent predicates. Time-invariant predicates that characterize eventual properties have typically the form
where Pr 0 is a communication predicate over the collection (HO(p, r0); SHO(p, r0))p∈Π.
HO machines for the benign case [6] can be seen as a special case of the above definition, with AS = ∅, which is equivalent to assuming the predicate P benign :: ∀p ∈ Π ∀r > 0 : SHO(p, r) = HO(p, r).
Consensus
In this paper, we concentrate on the consensus problem in V , where V is a (non-empty) totally ordered set. For this problem, every process has an initial value vp ∈ V and decides irrevocably on a decision value, fulfilling:
Integrity: If all processes have the same initial value this is the only possible decision value.
Agreement: No two processes may decide differently.
Termination: All processes eventually decide.
Since, contrary to classical approaches, there is no deviation according to T r p , and thus we do not have the notion of a faulty process, the upper specification makes no exemption: all processes should decide the initial value in the Integrity clause, and all processes must make a decision by the Termination clause.
Formally, an HO machine A, P solves consensus, if any run for which P holds, satisfies Integrity, Agreement, and Termination. To make this definition non-trivial, we assume that the set of HO and SHO collections for which P holds is non-empty.
The implementation of predicates is not discussed in this paper; it can be done in the spirit of [10] .
WHEN COMMUNICATION IS SAFE BUT NOT SO LIVE
In this section we present the first of our two algorithms, that we call the AT,E algorithm. The code of AT,E is given as Algorithm 1 and is designed to work under the predicates Pα and P A,live , given in (2) and (3) in Figure 1 . Basically, it consists in a parametrization of the two receive thresholds T and E of the OneThirdRule algorithm given in [6] for solving consensus in the presence of benign failures (there both are equal to ). The main features of OneThirdRule are: (i) the algorithm is always safe, whatever the number of benign transmission faults is, and (ii) the algorithm is fast in the sense that it requires two rounds to terminate in every fault free run, and ensures termination at the end of the first round if, in fault free runs, all initial values are equal. In the sequel, we show that, for appropriate choices of T and E, the AT,E algorithm both tolerates a large number of benign faults (omission) and nonbenign faults (corruption), while retaining the main features of OneThirdRule.
The AT ,E algorithm
In AT,E, each process p maintains a variable xp initially equal to p's initial value. At each round, process p broadcasts xp, and then updates xp if it receives more than T if |HO(p, r)| > T then 8:
xp := the smallest most often received value in this round 9:
if more than E values received are equal to v then 10:
decide(v)
("Threshold") messages: p sets xp to the smallest value that it has received most frequently. If p has received more than E ("Enough") times the same value v, then it decides on v.
Correctness of the AT ,E algorithm
First we introduce some piece of notation. For any variable x local to process p, we denote x (r) p the value of xp at the end of round r. For any value v ∈ V and any process p, at any round r > 0, we define the sets R 
where sq denotes q's state at the beginning of round r. The set R r p (v) (resp. Q r p (v)) represents the set of processes from which p receives v (resp. which ought to send v to p) at round r. Since at each round of the AT,E algorithm, every process sends the same message to all, the sets Q r p (v) do not depend on p, and so can be just denoted by Q r (v) without any ambiguity.
We start our correctness proof with a general basic lemma Lemma 1. For any process p and any value v, at any round r, we have:
Proof. Suppose that process p receives a message with value v at round r > 0 from process q. Then, either the code of q prescribes it to send v to p at round r, i.e., q belongs to Q r (v) and thus q is also in SHO(p, r), or the message has been corrupted and q is in AHO(p, r).
Lemma 1 naturally leads to consider the communication predicate Pα from (2): Pα bounds the size of AHO(p, r), i.e., it limits the discrepancy between the sets R r p and Q r . Our second lemma shows that choosing E ≥ n 2 renders the decision rule in the AT,E algorithm "deterministic".
, then the guard in line 9 of the AT,E algorithm is true for at most one value v.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that there exist a process p and a round r, so that the guard in line 9 is true for two distinct values v and v ′ . The code implies that |R 
we have |R
As an intermediate step to argue agreement, our next lemma shows that a stronger condition on E ensures no two processes can decide differently at the same round:
+ α then in any run of the HO machine AT,E, Pα there is at most one possible decision value per round.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that there exist two processes p and q that decide on different values v and v ′ in some round r > 0. From the code of AT,E, we deduce that |R 
The next lemma ensures that for sufficiently large T , once a process has decided, other processes may learn only the decision value in that round:
, then in any run of the HO machine AT,E, Pα such that process p decides value v at round r0, every process q that updates its variable xq at round r0 sets it to v.
Proof. Suppose that process p decides value v at round r0 > 0. Let q be any process such that |HO(q, r0)| > T , i.e., q modifies xq at round r0. Let Q r 0 (v) denote the set of processes that, according to their sending functions, ought to send messages different from v at round r0, and let R r 0 q (v) denote the set of processes from which q receives values different from v at round r0. Since each process sends a message to all at each round,
Since p makes a decision at round r0, by line 7, |R
With an argument similar to the one used in the proof of Lemma 1, we derive that |R
This implies that v is the most frequent value received by q at round r0. Then the code entails q to set xq to v.
We now extend the statement of Lemma 4 to hold also for any round after the decision:
, then in any run of the HO machine AT,E, Pα such that process p decides some value v at some round r0 > 0, every process q that updates its variable xq at some round r ≥ r0 necessarily sets it to v.
Proof. Assume process p decides value v at round r0 > 0. First we prove by induction on r that:
Basic case: r = r0. Since p decides v at round r0, then |R
= v}, and so the basic case follows.
Inductive step: r > r0. From the inductive assumption, we know that |{p ′ ∈ Π :
The same argument as in Lemma 4, because we have T ≥ 2(n+2α−E), yields |{p ′ ∈ Π : x (r) p ′ = v}| > E − α. Let q be some process that updates xq at some round
= v}| > E − α, the same argument as in Lemma 4 applies, and so the code entails q to set xq to v at round r.
From the above lemmas, we derive a sufficient condition on E and T which ensures that the HO machine AT,E, Pα satisfies the Agreement clause of consensus.
+ α and T ≥ 2(n + 2α − E), then there is at most one possible decision value in any run of the HO machine AT,E, Pα .
Proof. Let r0 > 0 be the first round at which some process p makes a decision, and let v be p's decision value. Assume that process q decides v ′ at round r. By definition of r0, we have r ≥ r0.
We proceed by contradiction, and assume that v = v ′ . By Lemma 3, we derive that r > r0. Since p decides v at round r0 and q decides v ′ at round r, Lemma 1 ensures that
Similarly, we derive sufficient conditions on E and T which ensures that the HO machine AT,E, Pα satisfies the Integrity clause of consensus.
Proposition 2 (Integrity).
If E ≥ α and T ≥ 2α, then in any run of the HO machine AT,E, Pα where all the initial values are equal to some value v0, the only possible decision value is v0.
Proof. Consider a run of the HO machine AT,E, Pα such that all the initial values are equal to v0.
First, by induction on r, we show that:
Note that according to the code of AT,E, p belongs to Q r (v0) if and only if x (r−1) p = v0, and so Q r (v0) = {p ∈ Π :
Basic case: r = 1. All the initial values are equal to v0. Therefore, every process sends a message with value v0 at round 1.
Inductive step: Let r > 1, and suppose that Q r−1 (v0) = Π. Let p be a process that updates its variable xp at round r − 1. Since AHO(p,
For liveness, we introduce the time-invariant communication predicate P A,live , given in Figure 1 , which (i) ensures all xq to eventually be identical, and (ii) guarantees that each process then hears of sufficiently many processes to make a decision.
Proposition 3 (Termination).
If n > E ≥ n 2 + α and n > T ≥ 2(n + 2α − E), then any run of the HO machine AT,E, Pα ∧ P A,live satisfies the Termination clause of consensus.
Proof. Since we have n > E and n > T , the set of all heard-of collections (HO(p, r); SHO(p, r))p∈Π, r>0 that fulfill Pα ∧ P A,live is non-empty, i.e., there exist runs that fulfill Pα ∧ P A,live . Let r be a round in a run of the HO machine (AT,E, Pα ∧ P A,live ) such that:
Because of E ≥ n 2 + α, the code implies that all xp for p in Π 1 r are equal to some common value v ∈ V . Since |Π
, a similar argument as the one used in Lemma 5 shows that every process q that updates xq at round r ′ > r definitely sets it to v. Moreover, from P
A,live
we have ∀r > 0, ∀q ∈ Π, ∃rq > r : |HO(q, rq)| > T . Therefore, there exist a round r ′ > r such that every process q in Π\Π 1 r updates xq after round r and by the end of round r ′ . Then we deduce that for each process q ∈ Π, we have
we know that every process p ∈ Π eventually receives strictly more than E messages with value v at some round rp > r ′ , and so decides v.
Combining Propositions 1, 2, and 3, we spin-off the following theorem: Theorem 1. If n > E and n > T ≥ 2(n + 2α − E), then the HO machine AT,E, Pα ∧ P A,live solves consensus.
Proof. Obviously, n > T ≥ 2(n + 2α − E) implies E ≥ n 2 + α. The Agreement clause is a straightforward consequence of Proposition 1. For Integrity, we just check that E ≥ α and T ≥ 2α are both ensured by n ≥ E ≥ n 2 + α and T ≥ 2(n + 2α − E), respectively. Indeed for all α ≥ 0, we have:
Termination directly follows from Proposition 3.
Consensus with AT ,E solutions
At this point, we have to examine whether for any integer α, 0 ≤ α ≤ n, there exist T and E such that AT,E, Pα ∧ P A,live solves consensus. In order to answer this question, Theorem 1 shows that it is sufficient to solve the following inequations:
Obviously, (4) and (5) imply α < n 4
. Conversely, assume 0 ≤ α < ≥ ǫ > 0. If we choose E = n−ǫ, then we have 2(n+2α−E) = n−2ǫ, and so 2(n + 2α − E) < n. It follows that if α < n 4
, then there exist T and E that satisfy (4) and (5), and so such that AT,E, Pα ∧ P A,live solves consensus. This naturally leads us to question what are the "best choices" for T and E, for any given integer α, 0 ≤ α < n 4 . Regarding the predicate P A,live , the best choices for T and E is taking them as small as possible. However, T and E are not independent of each other because of the requirement T ≥ 2(n + 2α − E). The "best choices" for T and E are paradoxical under the latter constraint, and so there is no best choice for T and E without specifying additional prerequisites on T and E. Note that roughly speaking, in P A,live , T plays the role of a minimal "liveness communication threshold" whereas E plays the role of a minimal "safety communication threshold" guaranteeing AT,E's correctness.
Without specific assumptions on communication, we look for T and E such that E = T . This yields the following inequality with α = n 4 − ǫ:
Obviously, inequality (6) can be replaced by E ≥ n − 4 3 ǫ. We easily check that E = n − 4 3 ǫ is a solution of the above system, since ǫ ≤ . In this case, we have E = T = (n + 2α) solves consensus.
Note that in the benign case (i.e., α = 0), we get E = T = exactly coincides with the OneThirdRule algorithm in [6] .
Interestingly, Theorem 1 shows that with AT,E, we do not lose any of the basic properties of the OneThirdRule algorithm even in the presence of corrupted communication. Indeed, like OneThirdRule, AT,E is quite resilient since, to be safe, it just requires Pα. Furthermore, from each initial configuration, there is at least one run of AT,E that achieves consensus in two rounds, and in the case all the initial values are equal, there is a run that achieves consensus just in one round. As the OneThirdRule algorithm, AT,E is thus fast in the sense of [12] .
WHEN COMMUNICATION IS LIVE BUT NOT SO SAFE
We now describe a second consensus algorithm tolerating more corruptions, denoted UT,E,α and given as Algorithm 2, that is designed to work under the predicates Pα, P U ,safe , and P U ,live , given in (2), (7), and (8) in Figure 2 . We use the same approach as for AT,E, namely we parametrize the various thresholds that occur in the UniformVoting algorithm given in [6] .
The UT ,E ,α algorithm
Informally, the algorithm works as follows. The UT,E,α algorithm is organized into phases, each composed of two rounds. Each process p maintains a variable xp, initialized to p's initial value. At the first round of each phase φ, every process p sends xp to all. Then, provided that p receives sufficiently many messages with some proper value v ∈ V , it votes for v (if so, we shall say that p casts a true vote); otherwise, p votes for "?". At the second round of φ, each process p sends its vote (in V ∪ {?}). Then it updates xp by setting it to some value v ∈ V if p can be sure that at least one process has voted for v. Otherwise, p adopts a default value v0 ∈ V as new estimate xp. When messages may be corrupted, being sure that at least one process voted for v, is no more guaranteed by the reception of just one vote for v as in the UniformVoting algorithm. This leads us to consider the communication predicate Pα, and then to parametrize the threshold for updating the xp (line 14), substituting α+1 for 1. Indeed, when Pα holds, if p receives at least α + 1 messages with value v ∈ V , then at least one process has definitely voted for v. At the end of phase φ, a process that has received sufficiently votes for some value v decides v.
Correctness of the UT ,E ,α algorithm
As for arguing the correctness of AT,E, we use Q r (v) and R r p (v), representing the set of processes that ought to send v, resp. from which p receives v at round r. First we give an obvious but useful technical lemma: Lemma 6. Let A and B be two subsets of Π. Then from |A| + |B| > n + α follows |A ∩ B| > α.
Proof. Because of |A ∩ B| = |A| + |B| − |A ∪ B| and |A ∪ B| ≤ n we have |A ∩ B| ≥ |A| + |B| − n. Further, since |A| + |B| > n + α, we have |A ∩ B| > n + α − n = α, as needed.
Like for AT,E, choosing E ≥ n 2 renders the decision rule "deterministic", as expressed in the following lemma.
, then at most one value can be decided per process per round. Now we are going to prove that if T ≥ n 2 + α, then the basic argument that ensures the safety of UniformVotingnamely, there is at most one true vote per round -still holds for UT,E,α. 
Thereby, there is at most one possible true vote value per round. Now assume that process p votes for v at round r. The code enforces any process q to update xq at the end of round r + 1. Suppose q updates xq by setting it to v ′ with v ′ ∈ {v, ?}. This implies |R r+1 q
Under the communication predicate Pα, we derive that at least one process hast voted for v ′ at round r, which contradicts that v is the only true vote at round r.
Contrary to AT,E , the predicate Pα is not sufficient to guarantee the Agreement clause for UT,E,α. Indeed, the following lemma leads us to introduce the additional communication predicate P U ,safe :
Note that P U ,safe involves both safety and liveness requirements for communication.
Lemma 9. Suppose that T ≥ n 2 + α. Under the predicate Pα ∧ P U ,safe , if a process p decides v at round r, then each process q necessarily sets xq to v at the end of round r.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary run of UT,E,α, Pα∧P U ,safe in which some process p decides value v at round r. The code implies that |R r p (v)| > E. By Lemma 1, it follows |Q r (v)| > E − α. Hence, under the predicate P U ,safe , we have:
Lemma 6 ensures that |Q r (v) ∩ SHO(q, r)| > α. Therefore, q receives at least α + 1 messages with value v at round r. Since T ≥ n 2 + α, the second part of Lemma 8 shows that q definitely sets xq to v.
From the above lemmas, we derive a sufficient condition on E, T and communication which ensures that the HO machine UT,E,α, Pα satisfies the Agreement clause of consensus.
Proposition 5 (Agreement)
+α, then any run of the HO machine UT,E,α, Pα∧P U ,safe satisfies the Agreement clause of consensus.
Proof. Let φ0 > 0 be the first phase at which a process p makes a decision, and let v be the value that p decides at round 2φ0. We first show, by induction on φ, that under the predicate Pα ∧ P U ,safe , we have:
U ,safe the same argument as the one in Lemma 9 ensures that each process q sets xq to v at round 2(φ − 1). Moreover, P U ,safe then guarantees that every process votes for v at round 2φ − 1.
′ be a process that decides v ′ at round 2φ. We proceed by contradiction and assume v = v ′ . On the one hand, the code implies that |R
On the other hand, we have just
Similarly, we derive a sufficient condition on communication which ensures that the HO machine UT,E,α, Pα ∧ P U ,safe to satisfies the Integrity clause of consensus.
+ α, then in any run of the HO machine UT,E,α, Pα ∧ P U ,safe such that all the initial values are equal to some value v, v is the only possible decision value.
Proof. Consider a run of the HO machine UT,E,α, Pα ∧ P U ,safe such that all the initial values are equal to v. Let p be a process that decides value v ′ at phase φ0.
Besides, using the same inductive argument as above, we show that under Pα ∧ P U ,safe , at every phase φ > 0, |Q 2φ (v)| > E − α. In particular, we have
For liveness, we exhibit the communication predicate given in Figure 2 . The first part forces all processes to hear of the same subset of processes at round 2φ0, and precludes any corruption at this round. It ensures all xp to be identical (all equal to some value v ∈ V ) at the end of phase φ0. The second part in P U ,live limits the number of corruption at the ∀φ, ∃φ0 ≥ φ, ∃Π0 ⊆ Π, ∀p ∈ Π :
next phase, and thus guarantees that at phase φ0 + 1, all processes vote for v. The last part of the predicate ensures that every process definitely hears of vote v sufficiently often to make a decision at the end of phase φ0 + 1. Thus, combining this remark with Propositions 5 and 6, we spin-off the following theorem:
+ α and n > T ≥ n 2 + α and n > α , then the HO machine UT,E,α, Pα ∧ P U ,safe ∧ P U ,live solves consensus. Proof. Since n > E, n > T and n > α, then the set of all heard-of collections (HO(p, r) ; SHO(p, r))p∈Π, r>0 that fulfill Pα ∧ P U ,safe ∧ P U ,live is non-empty when E ≥ n 2 + α. By Proposition 5 and 6, the Agreement and Integrity clauses are guaranteed when P U ,safe holds. Now, we show that any run ρ of the HO machine UT,E,α, Pα ∧ P U ,safe ∧ P U ,live satisfies the Termination clause of consensus. Let φ0 be a phase for which there exists a subset Π0 ⊆ Π such that:
The code implies that at the end of phase φ0, all the xp are equal to some unique value v ∈ V . Because of T ≥ n 2 + α, every process casts a true vote at round 2φ0 + 1, and by Lemma 8, each vote is for v. Hence every process receives strictly more than E messages with value v at round 2(φ0 + 1). Since E ≥ n 2 , Lemma 7 implies that every process decides v at this round.
Consensus with UT ,E ,α solutions
At this point, we have to examine whether for any given integer α, 0 ≤ α ≤ n, there exist T and E such that UT,E,α, Pα ∧ P U ,safe ∧ P U ,live solves consensus. From the expression of P U ,live , we deduce that this is equivalent to solve the following inequations:
Obviously, (11) implies α < n 2
, and so (11) implies (10) . Therefore, the latter three inequalities are equivalent to only (9) and (11).
As mentioned above, (11) implies α < n 2
. Conversely, assume 0 ≤ α < n 2
. Trivially, E = T = n 2 + α satisfy (9) and (11) . It follows that if α < n 2 , then there exist T and E such that UT,E,α, Pα ∧ P U ,safe ∧ P U ,live solves consensus. Note that in the case E = T = n 2 + α, the predicate P U ,safe guarantees that all the safe heard-of sets SHO(p, r), and so all the HO(p, r), are of cardinality greater than n 2 +α. Hence contrary to AT,E, the safety of UT,E,α is guaranteed by some permanent "liveness" properties of communication. Besides, UT,E,α tolerates more corruptions than AT,E ("α < n 2 " instead of "α < n 4 ").
RELATED WORK
Most previous work on consensus algorithms in the presence of non-benign faults relies on the paradigm of Byzantine processes, i.e., on permanent and static value faults. For the synchronous case the seminal papers are [13, 17] (which also include lower bounds). The partial synchronous case is considered in [2, 7] .
Byzantine variants for the famous Paxos algorithm include [1, 4, 14, 22] . An algorithm for Fast Byzantine Paxos has been proposed in [16] . The Byzantine Paxos definition is in fact closer related to Byzantine agreement than to consensus, and thus it is related to the notion of faulty processes as Integrity only restricts delivery of messages in the case of a correct broadcaster.
There exists only little work on dynamic and transient value faults: Santoro and Widmayer [18, 19] as well as Schmid et al. [20] provide lower bounds on agreement problems in the presence of dynamic value faults. We will discuss the relation to the literature on lower bounds before we present some general discussion of the modelling of non-benign faults.
Correspondence to Lower Bounds
Santoro and Widmayer [18, 19] show that agreement is already impossible to solve given a quite strong predicate, with as few as ⌊n/2⌋ faulty transmissions per round. The problematic case is when these ⌊n/2⌋ value faults occur in blocks, i.e., in every round the outgoing links of one process are affected. In every round this may happen to a different process. On the other hand, our algorithms allow up to n 2 /4 (for AT,E ), resp. n 2 /2 (for UT,E,α), transmission faults per round in general. However, our result is not contradicting the lower bound: It comes from the fact that we distinguish between the safety and liveness of the consensus algorithm, and assume transient failures. So, e.g. for AT,E, for safety it is sufficient that less than n/4 corruptions per process and round occur. But in order to ensure termination, two rounds are necessary where the assumptions are much higher than those given by the lower bound of Santoro and Widmayer (cf. to predicate P A,live ). Another way to circumvent the impossibility of Santoro and Widmayer is given for synchronous systems by Schmid et al. [20] . They restrict the number of the transmission faults for each round that correct processes may experience (both for outgoing and incoming messages), which prevents the blocks of faults of [18] . The synchronous system considered in [20] translates into a strong predicate, i.e., a large number of messages must be transmitted correctly in every round. This contrasts our work that separates predicates for safety and liveness, which leads our algorithms to require quite weak safety predicates but stronger ones for termination. They also provide lower bounds in a failure model which restricts both benign and non-benign transmission failures both on sender and receiver side. One special instance of their results where only value faults are considered yields that at most n/4 faults may occur in each round per sender and receiver. The predicates of UT,E,α reveal a trade-off.
UT,E,α allows that in most rounds more than n/4 (up to nearly n/2) received messages may be corrupted given that there exist rounds where processes experience much less corruptions.
The AT,E algorithm is fast in the sense that for each initial configuration there is a run where all processes decide in two rounds [5, 12] . For this, Martin and Alvisi [16] have established (4n + 1)/5 as a lower bound for the number of correct processes. For a similar reason as for the Santoro/Widmayer lower bound, here we have also no contradiction: Our model is more fine grained in two dimensions than theirs: First in the spacial dimension, where we reason in a per-link basis instead of a per-process basis. And, more important for this comparison, it is finer in the temporal dimension, since the quorums are measured in a per-round basis instead of assuming permanent faults. Thus, although we have a fast algorithm, we can have in each round, up to (n − 1)/4 processes that may emit corrupted information (cf. Section 3.3). On the other hand, for deciding we need at least one round where no process emits corrupted information. Further, we do not rely on separate recovery protocol and signatures, where the latter is not only computationally expensive but also questionable from a theoretical point of view: To the best of our knowledge, there exists no satisfactory rigorous definition of signatures in the context of Byzantine-tolerant distributed algorithms.
Lamport [11] has conjectured the lower bound N > 2Q + F + 2M for Byzantine consensus, where N is the number of acceptors, F is the maximum number of Byzantine acceptors despite which liveness is ensured, M is the maximum number of Byzantine acceptors despite which consensus safety is ensured, and Q is the number of Byzantine acceptors despite which the protocol is fast. We attain this bound with both of our algorithms: In the case the algorithm should just be safe (that is, it is not necessarily fast and does not satisfy the liveness conditions; corresponding to F = Q = 0), UT,E,α achieves safety with α = (n − 1)/2. If the algorithm should be safe and fast (but does not necessarily satisfy the liveness conditions, i.e., F = 0), we present such an algorithm via AT,E with α = (n − 1)/4. For both algorithms, F = 0 as we have stronger conditions for liveness, i.e., our algorithms cannot tolerate classic Byzantine (process) failures. Note, however, that we assume dynamic faults while Lamport's lower bound consider static Byzantine faults. Figure 3 shows, how an HO machine, in general, can suffer from corruption. The model at the top of the figure, where no value faults occur, is the benign case.
Relation to other non-benign fault models
The model at the bottom, where in an execution transitions might deviate from what is prescribed by transition functions and transmissions might deviate from what is prescribed by sending functions, corresponds to the classical Byzantine model assumption [13, 17] .
Naturally, there are two models that lie in between these two extreme cases. Based on the left, where transmissions always follow sending functions, but state transitions might not follow transition functions (thus also state corruptions may occur), one could design (broadcast based) algorithms that send the same message to all other processes. Given that transmissions follow the sending function, it is not possible that two different values from the same sender are received. Consequently, faulty behavior is restricted to "sym- [20] (also termed "identical Byzantine" in [3] ). Similar behavior can be implemented (if not a priori present) e.g. with signed messages. Thus, signatures are an important implementation concept in order to ensure such behavior. Given the lack of a formal definition of signatures, we believe that they should be studied in the context of predicate implementations but not as part of consensus algorithms. This also allows to separate between the mechanisms of consensus algorithms on the one hand and signatures on the other hand.
Finally, the right side case is the one considered in this paper, which is also the one of Santoro and Widmayer [18, 19] . One could argue that this approach is only of theoretical, but not of practical interest, given that techniques like signatures or error correcting codes could be used to transform value into benign failures, and consequently the right side model to the benign case. Since there are applications where this is not feasible due to the involved coverage (error correcting codes cannot correct all errors) or due to extensive computational cost, we provide solutions for the cases where such techniques cannot be used to eliminate all value faults. However, such techniques can be used to increase the coverage of our predicates.
Although we assume that T r p is always followed, the classical Byzantine assumptions can be expressed in our model. This stems from the fact that Byzantine processes are static and permanent faults. Thus, from the perspective of an outside observer it is indistinguishable whether such a process has a corrupted state or not.
3 Consequently, we can give, e.g., a predicate for a synchronous system with reliable links and at most f Byzantine processes: |SK| ≥ n − f and a predicate for an asynchronous system with reliable links and at most f Byzantine processes: ∀p ∈ Π : ∀r > 0 : |HO(p, r)| ≥ n − f ∧ |AS| ≤ f.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we investigated consensus in the presence of transient and dynamic value faults. To this end we generalized the round based HO model of [5, 6] which only consid- ered benign faults. Our novel framework includes predicates that allow also to express value faults like the classic Byzantine assumption [13, 17] as well as the dynamic fault model found in [18] . In [18] , Santoro and Widmayer prove an impossibility result for agreement problems in the dynamic setting. In contrast, we were interested in exploring system properties that would allow positive results: We introduced two consensus algorithms (derived from the benign case) that are suitable for systems in which the communication predicates given in Table 1 can be guaranteed. These predicates can be separated into safety and liveness conditions. Informally, the liveness conditions allow us to circumvent the impossibility of [18] . In contrast to classic literature, liveness of our algorithms does not rely on conditions that hold from some stabilization on, but only sporadically.
